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ARTICLES
THE CHANGING NATURE OF PUBLIC UTILITY
REGULATION: THE USED AND USEFUL PROPERTY
RATE BASE VERSUS THE CAPITALIZATION RATE
BASE IN THE NUCLEAR AGE
Melvin G. Dakin*
INTRODUCTION
In his dissenting opinion in the Southwestern Bell Telephone Case,
Justice Brandeis suggested:
The thing devoted by the investor to the public use is flot specific
property, tangible and intangible, but capital embarked in the en-
terprise . ..
The investor agrees, by embarking capital in a utility, that its
charges to the public shall be reasonable. . . .The compensation
which the Constitution guarantees an opportunity to earn is the
reasonable cost of conducting the business. Cost includes not only
operating expenses, but also capital charges. Capital charges cover
the allowance, by way of interest, for the use of the capital, what-
ever the nature of the security issued therefore; the allowance for
risk incurred; and enough more to attract capital.'
The Federal Power Commission might have been the "bell wether ' '2
in bringing about the widespread adoption of the Brandeis capitalization
rate base had the commission chosen to use it in the Hope case;3 a majority
was satisfied in the case, however, to make the transition from a "fair
value" rate base to an original cost rate base,4 although a dissenting
Copyright 1985 by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* Professor Emeritus of Law, Louisiana State University
1. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 290-91, 43
S. Ct. 544, 547 (1923).
2. Probably not a well-chosen aphorism since state regulatory commissions are no-
toriously restive under Federal leadership.
'3. Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 64 S. Ct. 281
(1944).
4. Cleveland & Akron v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 44 P.U.R. (N.S.) 1, 16 (FPC
1942).
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commissioner argued for a complete transition.'
Justice Brandeis did not live to see his prudent investment-capi-
talization rate base widely adopted. Following the example of the Fed-
eral Power Commission, it was typically modified, (as by the Louisiana
Public Service Commission) to mean that in order to avoid confiscation
"the thing which is required to be protected . . . is the money invested
in used and useful property and not the ever changing and illusory
value of the property."' 6 What we see today in the majority of the
voluminous commission decisions reprinted in, e.g., the 4th series of
Public Utilities Reports, is a hybrid approach in which a rate of return
(the capital charge of Justice Brandeis) is conventionally calculated for
a test period on the basis of the outstanding capital obligations of the
utility. This rate of return is then applied, however, to a property rate
base consisting of property "used and useful" or "on line" during the
test period. 7 This means that the rate base conventionally does not
include construction work in progress (CWIP) which is excluded on the
ground that an alternative method of compensating such plant is re-
garded as adequate by regulatory authorities. The alternative method
consists of adding an allowance for funds used during construction
(AFUDC) to the other costs of construction and reducing the return
requirement by this amount. The return resulting when CWIP, includ-
ing AFUDC, is put in service is deemed adequate compensation for
the capital thus employed, but the result is to leave such capital at
the risk and carrying charge of the stockholders during the construction
period. 8 This procedure is in part justified on the ground that to in-
clude CWIP in productive plant is deemed to pose the necessity of
attributing hypothetical earnings to it in order to avoid distortion of
the actual earnings relationship to the productive plant during the test
period.
When CWIP was not such a substantial part of total utility prop-
erty, and securities outstanding were thus not greatly in excess of used
and useful property, the conventional procedure did not pose serious
financial problems. But with the advent of nuclear power plants (under
construction for as many as ten or fifteen years) as much as forty
percent of a utility capital structure may be devoted to CWIP.9 None-
theless, the traditional distinction between the used and useful plant
and CWIP is maintained by many states and the rate base is limited
5. Id. at 44. The same result was practically achieved since Hope was wholly
capitalized with common stock, the common equity approximately equaling the net property
rate base adopted.
6. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 65 P.U.R. (N.S.)
18, 22 (La. 1946).
7. E.g., In re Gulf States Util. Co., 20 P.U.R. (4th) 154-55 (La. 1977).
8. Id.
9. E.g., In re Commonwealth Edison Co., 43 P.U.R. (4th) 503, 528, 550 (Il. 1981).
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to plant in service; the funds devoted to CWIP, as noted, are deemed
adequately compensated by including in CWIP accumulated AFUDC
and allowing an actual return to be earned only when CWIP is moved
"onto line" and into the rate base.' 0
THE CASH FLOW PROBLEM; CWIP AND AFUDC
Without the more liberal return possibilities in the "fair return on
fair value" approach to regulation, the time lapse between investment
of funds and the generation of a return on those funds when a new
plant is put into service has the clear potential for creating a cash flow
shortage. When construction of nuclear plants extends over ten or a
dozen years the potential for cash shortages becomes acute. This pos-
sibility grows clearer when it is noted that the capital structure carrying
the entire plant is the vehicle for calculating the needed rate of return;
the rate determined is applied, however, to a rate base limited to the
plant which is "on line" and hence "used and useful."'' The rate base,
in the case of a utility engaged in nuclear plant construction may be
several billion dollars less than the capital structure since the latter
necessarily encompasses plants under construction as well as plants "on
line.''' 2
The Bonbright Suggestion
Long before the current practice of relaxing the "used and useful"
approach to allow inclusion of CWIP in the rate base either partially
or in entirety, Bonbright was expressing concern over the problems
posed for the utilities by the abandonment of the "fair return on fair
value" approach and the adoption of a "cost of capital" approach
applied to the "used and useful" original-cost rate base. 3 While long
a critic of the "specious aura of expertise and objectivity"'' 4 with which
the fair value or reproduction cost view of utility plant was presented
to regulatory authorities, Bonbright was also acutely aware of the po-
tential constriction on the flow of investment funds into utilities which
the new approach augured. He doubted that a flexible rate of return
would be used with the degree of liberality needed to achieve the le-
gitimate goals of the industry. 5 The Bonbright idea, which is plausible
but has had only limited overt adoption, was the suggestion that the
common equity portion of the rate base be restated on a current basis
by applying index-number adjustments to the original dollars of plant
10. E.g., In re Iowa Pub. Serv. Co., 21 P.U.R. (4th) 339, 346-47 (S. Dak. 1977).
11. 43 P.U.R. (4th) at 550, 556.
12. Id. at 543.
13. J. Bonbright, Principles of Public Utility Rates 270-74 (1961).
14. Id. at 238.
15. Id. at 256.
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representing common stock investment (and reinvestment through sur-
plus).' 6 Given the added protection to "coverage" of senior security
charges which would be achieved, this enhancement of the rate base
would generate the needed dollars, he reasoned, to assure not only a
flow of common stock investment but debt and preferred stock in-
vestment as well.' 7
A few states have experimented with a variation of the Bonbright
idea. For example, Illinois incorporated in its findings a "fair value"
rate base arrived at by stating 76 percent of the used and useful plant
at original cost and restating 24 percent of the plant at current cost.' 8
The percentages used by the Illinois Commission were a compromise
from the 33 percent restatement proposed by the utility which had
common equity amounting to 33 percent of capital structure.' 9
Another variation of the Bonbright procedure appears in a new
utilities regulatory scheme adopted by Texas in 1975.20 In the statute
the term "fair value" is not used; instead, the commission is directed
not to prescribe rates which will yield more than a fair return on an
"adjusted value of invested capital." The commission is vested with
discretion to fix an adjusted rate base with from twenty-five percent
to forty percent restated at current cost and the remainder at original
cost.
2
'
In neither Illinois nor Texas is the Bonbright suggestion fully applied
however. In Texas, the actual rate of return is calculated using a wholly
original-cost rate base and, after translation into dollars of return, the dol-
lars are related to the "adjusted" rate base and a determination made as to
the resulting rate of return on adjusted value, which is then deemed either
"adequate" or "inadequate. '22 The adjusted value thus plays no role in the
actual generation of dollars of return. Bonbright presumably had in mind
the actual utilization of an adjusted rate base by applying to it the rate of
return percentage arrived at in an analysis of the entire capital structure. 23
Such a procedure would determine the return or capital cost necessary for
the common equity, combine that return with the embedded costs of debt
and preferred stock by conventional weighting, and arrive at the overall rate
of return to be applied to an adjusted rate base. 24 The window-dressing role
16. Id. at 274-77.
17. Id. at 280-81.
18. In re Commonwealth Edison Co., 43 P.U.R. (4th) at 528.
19. Id. at 527, 550.
20. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1446(c) (Vernon 1963 & Supp. 1978). Critiqued
in Butler, Utility Regulation-Coming of Age in Texas, 31 Baylor L. Rev. 473 (1979).
21. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 1446(c) at § 41(a) (Vernon 1963 & Supp. 1978).
22. E.g., Houston Lighting and Power Co., 50 P.U.R. (4th) 157, 213-14 (Tex. 1982).
23. J. Bonbright, supra note 13, at 191.
24. Id. at 243.
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assigned to the procedure in Texas has been approved by the judiciary.5
AUGMENTING CASH FLOW WITHOUT FAIR VALUE
Modification of the "used and useful" rate base concept
Wisconsin is one of the few states candidly treating the problem of
permitting generation of enough dollars to service the entire debt and pro-
vide a return on the entire common equity devoted to the public service.
A typical statement encountered in commission opinions is as follows:
Applicant's average net investment rate base plus construction work
in progress is 99.59 percent of capital applicable primarily to utility
operations. This is a reasonable and just factor for use in trans-
lating cost of capital previously found reasonable and just . . .
into return requirements applicable to net investment rate base.2 6
However, even the Wisconsin approach does not ensure a "just and
reasonable factor" where CWIP is substantially in excess of ten per cent
of the property base, as it may well be where nuclear plant construction is
involved. The commission includes all CWIP not in excess of ten percent
of the property rate base but insures only some cash flow for CWIP in
excess of ten percent of rate base. This additional cash flow is accom-
plished by permitting the utility to capitalize AFUDC on the excess of
CWIP over ten percent of rate base at seven percent and allowing the
excess to earn a cash return at the difference between the AFUDC rate of
seven percent and the composite cost of capital fixed for the utility. 27 The
commission expressed no concern over violation of the "used and useful
property" concept; one can only conjecture as to what the commission
would do if the excess was as substantial as it would be in the case of
nuclear plant construction-a problem which has not arisen in Wisconsin,
thanks probably to commission intervention.
The District of Columbia commissioners were, for many years, equally
untroubled about the inclusion of CWIP in rate base and allowed a full
return thereon in order to put CWIP on a "pay-as-you-go" basis and thus
ensure the ability of the utility to meet "all its capital obligations. ' 21 The
25. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 571 S.W.2d 503, 514-15
(Tex. 1978).
26. In re Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp., 52 P.U.R. (4th) 389, 397 (Wis. 1983).
27. id. at 397.
28. In re Potomac Elec. Power Co., 89 P.U.R. (N.S.) 483, 502 (D.C. 1951). See
also 29 P.U.R. (4th) 517, 546-555 (D.C. 1979); The D.C. practice was judicially approved
in Goodman v. Public Serv. Comm'n of D.C., 497 F.2d 661 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the court
noting that "the funds [were] being used for the benefit of the public just as much as
funds invested in plant in service ...." particularly where "the record has demonstrated a
continuing need for permanently financing a large construction program." Id. at 668-69.
An argument that the responsibility should properly fall on the investors was turned aside
on the ground that this "overlooks the fact that . ..Pepco has not capitalized interest
during construction" and that "[t]he utility must be compensated either by including in
the rate base interest during construction [AFUDC] or by including in the rate base the
value of funds invested in the plant during construction." Id. at 667-68.
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approach was continued down to 1982 when the District Peoples Counsel
successfully argued that unfairness resulted from this violation of the "used
and useful" concept and this distortion of the conventional-test-period ap-
proach; 29 a substantial factor in the policy reversal was, expectably, the
long periods involved in the construction of nuclear powered plants.30 The
D.C. commission thus abandoned a procedure which moved towards a
capitalization rate base, and joined the ranks of the majority of state com-
missions stating: "We find that it is time to strike a more equitable balance
between Pepco and its present and future customers. . . . We believe that
as a matter of policy, present customers should not pay for facilities that
will be used to provide service for future customers."'"
The rejection by the D.C. commission hardly represented a return to
the prior "used and useful" rate base, with CWIP moved into it only when
the new plant came "on line;" the "cash flow" problems precipitated by
large scale, long-term construction, even though non-nuclear, financed in
substantial part by outside capital, have still to be met. An early instance
of "strategic behavior"32 required to meet such "cash flow" needs under
the new policy quickly surfaced in a telephone rate case; the utility urged
inclusion of short-term CWIP in the rate base, even though not yet on
line, in order to generate more income.33 Somewhat of a tour de force was
necessary to accommodate the D.C. commission's departure from its re-
cent restoration of the "used and useful" rate base concept; it was said
that CWIP had been excluded from the rate base not on the "used and
useful" doctrine but on the fact that the company capitalized interest on
its construction projects. Since it was now including CWIP in the rate base
without capitalized interest, it could not be violating the "used and useful"
doctrine!"+
29. In re Potomac Elec. Power Co., 29 P.U.R. (4th) at 554.
30. Id. at 555. The D.C. Commission expressed concern about "the inordinately long
time that . . . units have been under construction and earning a return without any
tangible benefits flowing to consumers." Id.
31. Id. at 554.
32. The term "strategic behavior" was used by Baron & Taggart, Regulatory Pricing
Procedures and Economic Incentives, in Issues in Public Utility Pricing and Regulation
27 (1980) to refer to the practices resorted to by regulated firms to influence regulated
prices and enhance profits where limitations of regulatory authorities in their price-setting
procedures preclude consistency with economic-efficiency criteria. It is used here also to
include practices to improve cash flow accomplished by regulatory authorities by manip-
ulation of their highly structured regulatory formats.
33. In re Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 43 P.U.R. (4th) 169, 181 (D.C. 1981)
(the utility argued for inclusion so as to achieve consistency with Federal Communications
Commission policy).
34. Id at 182. A utility would hardly argue for both inclusion of CWIP in the rate
base and continuance of capitalizing AFUDC thereon in the same period; it would,
however, argue for the inclusion of CWIP and AFUDC up to the point of inclusion in
order to achieve "pay-as-you-go" status for CWIP and alleviate cash flow problems. A
clear violation of the "used and useful" rate base principle is thus necessarily involved.
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The Federal Power Commission (Now FERC) Policy Announcement on
Inclusion of C WIP in Rate Base
The policy change at FERC and the statements which accompanied its
announcement provide dramatic evidence of what has happened in utility
financing, primarily as a result of the advent of nuclear plant construction.
The commission, in announcing a rule permitting the inclusion of CWIP
in the rate base, said:
The FPC will permit, in individual proceedings, inclusion of CWIP
in rate base where the utility is in severe financial stress. The fi-
nancial circumstances that we contemplate are those in which it
would be clearly detrimental to utility wholesale customers if some
amount of CWIP were not permitted in rate base. In particular,
we envision a situation in which the rate of return necessary to
enable the utility to maintain its credit and attract capital in ac-
cordance with the standards of the Bluefield [262 U.S. 679 (1923)]
decision would be materially in excess of the cost of capital for
otherwise similar utilities. Such a circumstance might arise, for
example, where the exigencies of the utility's construction program
are such as to reduce its interest coverage to such an extent that
additional capital cannot be raised at reasonable rates and that an
amount of earning sufficient to attract capital would require a rate
of return on equity substantially in excess of the cost of equity
capital to otherwise similar electric utilities. Under such circum-
stances, it would be to the benefit of the consumer if the additional
earnings necessary to attract capital were permitted by way of a
return on CWIP rather than by way of an inflated return on the
traditional rate base since the former treatment would eventually
be reflected in a lower rate base by way of reduced AFUDC allow-
ance, while the latter would not.35
The commission recognized a number of factors militating against the
blanket inclusion of CWIP in all cases, the primary one being the familiar
fact that there may be a lack of identity between present ratepayers and
the future ratepayers who are the primary beneficiaries of including CWIP
in the rate base. But it would not adhere to an absolute rule that plant
must be "used and useful" in the traditional sense before inclusion in the
rate base, noting that "[wjere the plant not under construction, the con-
sumers might well be facing a certain danger of future power insuffi-
ciency. .. 36
35. F.P.C. Order No. 555, Order Adopting in Part Construction Work in Progress
Rulemaking and Termination Proceedings, 56 F.P.C. 2939, 2946 (1976).
36. Id at 2943. Adoption of the rule has precipitated opposition at both state and
national levels, particularly since FERC removed the test of "severe financial distress"
and permitted utilities subject to its jurisdiction to file for inclusion of 50% of CWIP
in rate base. See 18 C.F.R. 35.26 (c)(3) (1984). See also editorial comment, Ill Pub.
Util. Fort. March 31, 1983 at 37, 40. For later developments, particularly the introduction
and progress of H.R. 555, Construction Work in Progress Policy Act of 1982, see 113
Pub. Util. Fort. 50, 53 (March 1, 1984). The bill would restrict the inclusion of CWIP
in the rate base to instances in which the internally generated cash flow of a utility is
less than 40 percent of construction expenditures.
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The FERC Approach in State Practice; New Jersey
The impact of the FERC approach on the search for adequate cash
revenues was illustrated in a rate case recently decided by a New Jersey
utilities board. 7 The total capital structure amounted to approximately 5.8
billion dollars, the common equity accounting for some 2.2 billion dollars.
The total rate base included CWIP of some 1.36 billion dollars and
amounted to 5.6 billion dollars or 95.5 percent of capitalization. The com-
mission allowed a common equity return of 16 percent and an over-all rate
of return of 10.67 percent.38 Had CWIP not been included, the return for
the common stock would have been short by some 150 million dollars of
achieving a sixteen percent return on the common equity of 2.2 billion
dollars. 39 That shortage in cash flow, or at least part of it, would have had
to be made up from other sources of cash flow including, of course, the
possible increase in the rate of return. Bonbright, writing in 1961, thought
that inclusion of large amounts of CWIP in the rate base would be a
questionable departure from the "used and useful" rate base principle. 40
However, might he not countenance such a departure where the financial
integrity of a utility is seriously threatened rather than resort to an arbi-
trary increase in the rate of return to close the gap between earnings on a
"used and useful" rate base and the demands of the utility capital struc-
ture? In the New Jersey case, for example, to provide an additional 150
million dollars in net operating revenue (NOR) on a rate base excluding
CWIP would have meant increasing the allowed rate of return from 10.67
percent to over fourteen percent, an increase obviously difficult for con-
sumer groups to accept. 41
Typically, once a commission realizes that traditional capitalization of
AFUDC will not solve the cash problem because the time lag is too great,
the "used and useful" concept as a governing principle is played down and
instead the talk shifts to balancing the burdens between rate payers and
shareholders, thus enabling the commission to include some, but not nec-
essarily all, of CWIP.42 Such criteria (as when CWIP will go "on line" or
what percentage of the rate base will be permitted as CWIP) are not aban-
doned but the primary issue becomes the effect on investors' criteria such
as coverage for the debt, with and without capitalizing AFUDC, and what
percentage of earnings is represented by capitalized AFUDC, together with
the rate of discount that is applied by the market to such earnings. 43
37. In re Public Serv. Elec. and Gas Co., 46 P.U.R. (4th) 322 (N.J. 1982).
38. Id. at 334.
39. Id. at 336.
40. J. Bonbright, supra note 13, at 178.
41. 46 P.U.R. (4th) at 335-36.
42. E.g., In re Commonwealth Edison Co., 43 P.U.R. (4th) at 523.
43. Id. at 521-26, 549.
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Legislative Adoption of the FERC Approach-North Carolina
The modification of a fair return on the used and useful plant in serv-
ice to include a fair return on at least part of CWIP and the accompanying
capital obligations invested in utility plants is also dramatically illustrated
by amendments to the North Carolina regulatory statutes during the 1970's.
A pertinent excerpt follows:
In fixing . . .rates, the Commission shall . . .ascertain the
reasonable original cost of the public utility's property used and
useful, or to be used and useful within a reasonable time after the
test period [less recovered depreciation] .. .plus the reasonable
original cost of investment in plant under construction [CWIP]
• ..In ascertaining the cost of the public utility's property, [CWIP]
• ..as of the effective date of this subsection shall be excluded
until such plant comes into service but reasonable and prudent
expenditures for ... [CWIP] after the effective date of this sub-
section may be included, to the extent the commission considers
such inclusion in the public interest and necessary to the financial
stability of the utility in question...
Fix such return on the cost of the property . .as will enable the
public utility by sound management to produce a fair return for
its shareholders ...maintain its facilities and services in accord-
ance with the reasonable- requirements of its customers ...and
...[compete] in the market for capital funds on terms which are
reasonable and which are fair to its customers and to its existing
investors . ..
In processing rate applications after enactment of the statute, the commis-
sion might have reasoned that the language in the second paragraph quoted
above authorized it to fix a return adjusted to include current compensa-
tion for capital obligations representing CWIP since that was necessary to
"maintain its facilities and service in accordance with the reasonable re-
quirements of its customers." However, that would probably have entailed
too sharp a departure from the property-rate-base concept. Instead, the
shift (as noted below) was the inclusion of so much of CWIP as "necessary
to the financial stability of the utility."
The North Carolina legislature was certainly influenced by the same
considerations which influenced FERC in adopting its 1976 CWIP policy.
FERC noted that construction capital might be so costly as to reduce in-
terest coverage and require a return on equity "substantially in excess of
the cost of equity capital to otherwise similar utilities" and concluded that:
it would be to the benefit of the consumer if the additional earn-
ings necessary ...were permitted by way of a return on CWIP
44. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 62-133 (b)(1), (4) (1982) (emphasis added).
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rather than by way of an inflated return on the traditional rate
base since the former treatment would eventually be reflected in a
lower rate base by way of reduced AFUDC allowance while the
latter would not. 45
In a case arising under the noted statute, a utility proposed inclusion of
substantially all CWIP, 46 but after hearing testimony the commission in-
cluded only that amount of CWIP in the rate base sufficient to increase
interest coverage (without AFUDC inclusion) from 2 to 2.5. In summary,
the commission said:
When this level of coverage is considered along with such other
indicia as CP&L'S capital structure (38 percent equity), the per-
centage of AFUDC in earnings, the fact that the new Mayo I plant
will be on line in 1983, and the recent sale of plant to the power
agency, the commission concludes that today's order will allow the
company to maintain its financial stability.4 7
The effect on common equity earnings was to increase them from 101
million dollars to 145 million dollars. To accomplish the same result through
the overall rate of return would have required an increase from 11.57 per-
cent to 14.7 percent. As in the New Jersey case, 48 this would obviously be
a less palatable mode of procedure to consumer advocates.
Other Commission Responses-Louisiana
The Louisiana commission has not been unresponsive to the problem
of maintaining a utility's financial stability where a substantial portion of
its capital obligations must carry non-earning CWIP. The following quo-
tations from a 1980 Louisiana order present an interesting exercise in jus-
tification of commission departure from the "used and useful" rate base.
The commission generally has adhered to the regulatory policy
that would require an inclusion of AFUDC in adjusted operating
income at the fair rate of return. However, in the recent past this
commission and other regulatory bodies have found it necessary
to compromise this principle to accommodate a more pressing
public utility requirement: the need to attract capital to finance
construction. This need must be met in order for utilities to be
able to properly serve their customers. The capital markets, with
or without good reason, have come to regard "real earnings" as
more valuable than AFUDC. Thus, the full amount of AFUDC
in many instances is not counted in computing the fixed charge
45. F.P.C. Order No. 555, supra note 35. See also supra note 36 for broadening of
the rule by FERC.
46. In re Carolina Power & Light Co., 49 P.U.R. (4th) 188, 252 (N.C. 1982).
47. Id. at 254.
48. See supra text accompanying note 41.
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capital coverages of a company. In instances in which utilities have
disproportionately large construction programs, the application of
a policy that requires the inclusion of AFUDC in operating income
at the full rate prevents the utility from meeting coverage require-
ments and attracting capital....
The massive construction program of Gulf States requires the
attraction of large amounts of capital, and the coverages required
for this action would not be achieved without the allowance of
more "real earnings" than would be realized under a "net" rate
of AFUDC ....
In this case, a significant amount of the CWIP of Gulf States
is invested in the River Bend nuclear project. An expert recom-
mended . . . that the River Bend CWIP be excluded from the
amounts used to compute AFUDC. The ten-year study ... of the
construction and capital requirements of Gulf States indicates that,
if this approach is adopted, Gulf States will be able to finance its
construction program. This recommendation will be accepted by
the commission. A reduction of $18,731,000 in the amount of
AFUDC included in operating income is required.4 9
In light of the method used in handling AFUDC, it was unnecessary for
the commission to indicate the dollars of CWIP which were, in effect,
included in the earning rate base. The utility in question operates in two
jurisdictions so that the capital obligations data consist only of the capital
structure stated in percentages of debt, preferred stock, and common eq-
uity.5 0 Thus, the opinion gives no indication of the dollars required to
service the capital obligations carrying plant in service and CWIP; how-
ever, the CWIP included in the rate base is obviously the plant under
construction represented by 18.7 million dollars of AFUDC. The increase
in the rate of return which would be required if this item of CWIP were
not included in the rate base cannot be accurately determined. We know
only that the 18.7 million dollars represents some 2.2 percent of the 10.8
percent rate of return allowed by the Louisiana commission."
To an unpracticed eye, the Louisiana Commission seems to be depart-
ing from the principle of including only used and useful property in the
rate base. However, while the statement is made that CWIP is "included
49. Ex parte Gulf States Util. Co., 40 P.U.R. (4th) 593, 597-98 (La. 1980).
50. Id. at 599.
51. Id. at 599-600. This assumes that the $94.6 million allowed Net Operating Income
(NOR) includes $18.7 million AFUDC and that excluding that amount in calculating a
rate of return would reduce the rate from 10.8% on the allowed rate base of $878.5
million to 8.6% on that base, a difference of 2.2%. Some indication of the role of this
concession is given, perhaps, by comparing the return on common equity of 17.5% to
18.5% said to be required by experts for the utility, with the 13.75% to 14.25% allowed
by the commission although, again, since data on the capital obligations was not included
in the opinion, no accurate inferences can be drawn as to the equity rate of return which
would have been required absent the commission concession.
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in the rate base ' 5 2 together with interest capitalized (AFUDC), the effect
of the inclusion is normally negated (in terms of allowing "real" earnings
thereon) by the practice of adding AFUDC to net operating income (NOR),
thereby preventing the included CWIP from remedying any deficiency in
revenue. It should be noted that the dollars of needed NOR are determined
by applying the rate of return to a rate base including CWIP, but the
deficiency in dollars, if any, is determined by deducting therefrom the test
period NOR which includes AFUDC. Thus, normally no real dollar defi-
ciency will be generated by the inclusion of CWIP in rate base. 3 This
elaborate charade provides the backdrop against which the commission
could, in this case, grant relief to assure "attraction of capital" by stating
that it would "eliminate the AFUDC entry [as to a nuclear plant under
construction], resulting in higher rates but decreasing the amount of the
rate base in the future on which ratepayers must pay the fair rate of return
and which would be returned to the utility through depreciation. 5 4 In
other words, if AFUDC is not used to increase NOR it will not be added
to CWIP as future rate base.5
"Matching" Used or Useful Property With The Revenue Requirement or
"Matching" the Revenue Requirement With Capital Obligations
To many state commissions compelling arguments persist for refusing
to allow a current cash flow on CWIP. It is suggested that in a competitive
environment no return is earned on CWIP and cash flow problems must
be solved as best they can be by corporate ingenuity and innovation; com-
parable incentive in the regulated utility field must be provided by the
regulators. There is growing recognition, however, that the problems posed
by nuclear plant construction are of such magnitude that time-honored
principles of regulation must give way if the problems are to be sohed. A
Maine commission expressed it this way:
52. Id. at 595.
53. Id. at 597.
54. Id.
55. The alternative approach of excluding CWIP at the outset' and then including
some or all of it as dictated by financial need has the advantage of simplicity; interest
expense and other capital charges (AFUDC) can be reduced "below the line" to the
extent capitalized. (e.g., see, 18 C.F.R. pt. 104, Elec. Plant Instructions 2(B) at 446-47
(1984). A determination of the rate of AFUDC to be capitalized must, however, then be
made using the rate base plus CWIP to accomplish "interest synchronization," e.g., In
re Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co., 46 P.U.R. (4th) 505, 541-42 (Me. 1982). FERC requires use
of a formula for utilities subject to its jurisdiction which gives what it deems proper
weight to the role of short-term debt in the financing of construction, e.g., In re Arizona
Pub. Serv. Co., 46 P.U.R. (4th) 242, 247 (FERC 1982). But a number of states lump all
debt together for a simpler calculation of the AFUDC rate (e.g., 46 P.U.R. (4th) at 558).
The resulting rate of return is then used for the capitalization of AFUDC until modified
by later rate cases and assures the utility of complete recovery of all capital costs incident
to CWIP through subsequent depreciation charges. Id. at 552-53.
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The experience of recent years shows that, as construction budg-
ets and financing costs rise, strict adherence to the matching prin-
ciple may be achieved at the cost of rates that are higher than
would otherwise be necessary. Thus, a utility with a large amount
of plant under construction, which generates only non-cash earn-
ings pursuant to the matching principle, may find that access to
capital to continue construction may only bd had on terms less
favorable than those extended to a utility with smaller capital re-
quirements or larger cash earnings.
Were the commission to be faced with such a situation, it would
have to assess the comparative costs and benefits to ratepayers,
investors, the utility, and the public interest of adhering to the
matching principle and the construction program in the face of
rising capital costs, or of deviating from either the principle or the
program to some degree in order to preserve the financial integrity
of the utility. Thus, were the commission to conclude from the
evidence before it that continuation of its policy denying a current
cash return on CWIP would have a substantial adverse effect upon
the utility's financial condition in the face of a necessary construc-
tion program, it might well alter that policy to the extent necessary
to prevent the harm and to assure that needed plant could be built
on reasonable terms. 56
Strategic Behavior; Manipulation of the Rate of Return
The Illinois commission's approach to the problems of one of its giant
utilities"7 illustrates the kind of "strategic behavior" engendered by the
need to bridge the enormous gap which develops when major nuclear con-
struction is excluded from the rate base but capital obligations necessitated
by the construction must nonetheless be provided for in the calculation of
revenue requirement.
In the Illinois commission's analysis of statistics vital to the utility's
financial health, it was noted that test-year data indicated that AFUDC
additions to NOR represented eighty-six percent of the "earnings" per
common share, that this percentage would increase in the following year
to ninety-five percent and that the utility had been forced to sell additional
securities in order to keep itself in funds to pay common and preferred
dividends and to pay interest on its debt.5 8 This procedure, innovative though
it might be, inevitably contributed to the deterioration in earnings and the
56. In re Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co., 46 P.U.R. (4th) at 539.
57. In re Commonwealth Edison Co., 43 P.U.R. (4th) at 503.
58. Id. at 521-22. The Financial Standards Accounting Board, the chief rulemaking
body for accountants, is considering proposed rules which would limit a utility's ability
to defer costs and claim profits that haven't been realized as they now can, using AFUDC
procedures. See Wall Str. J., Nov. 20, 1984, at 33, col.3.
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value of the investor's stock equity.
The Illinois commission determined a rate base of some 4.1 billion
dollars at original cost which, with other rate base items, aggregated to
some 4.8 billion dollars; to this it added 730 million dollars of CWIP,
which resulted, with other adjustments, in a rate base of some 5.4 billion
dollars.5 9 This base was used to provide for revenue requirements (and cash
needs) to service capital obligations aggregating 9.6 billion dollars. 60
Obviously the cash flow deficiency of a utility in which forty-eight
percent of total capitalization was represented by CWIP and eighty-six
percent of earnings for common equity was represented by AFUDC, could
not be remedied by including this modest portion of CWIP in the rate
base. The utility proposed that in such circumstances, not less than an
eighteen or nineteen percent return was required for common equity. The
staff proposed approximately sixteen percent. The commission concluded:
It is essential to the company and its ratepayers that the cost of
external financing be kept at a minimum, to the extent that such
control can be reasonably and fairly maintained. In its most recent
credit rating, Edison was classified as an A/A-company in the
financial market. This rating cannot reasonably be expected to be
maintained without giving heed to the quality of certain financial
ratios and the company's continuing ability to attract financing.
These ratios were set forth and made a part of the commission's
interim order. Since the commission's interim order, the cost of
capital has continued to rise. A reexamination of these ratios based
on the current costs of capital indicates that a 17.5 percent return
on equity should result in a pretax interest coverage, including
AFUDC, of approximately 2.36 times ...
The commission's decision regarding a fair rate of return must
be one based on reasoned judgment. The commission, in reaching
its decision on a fair rate of return, has considered the continuing
inflation in our economy, the volatile nature of current interest
rates, the generally depressed condition of the electric utility com-
mon stocks, the deratings of the company's debt, the limitations
of current regulatory tools, and the decision to include certain
construction work in progress in rate base.
6
'
At this point the opinion grows vague. The Illinois commission allowed
a rate of return of 11.9 percent and applied the rate to an original-cost
rate base which included some 730 million dollars of CWIP (out of total
CWIP of some 4.6 billion dollars). 62 The commission then cagily translated
the allowed rate into a rate of return on a "fair value" rate base of 7.6
59. In re Commonwealth Edison Co., 43 P.U.R. (4th) at 528-29.
60. Id. at 549-50.
61. Id. (emphasis added).
62. Id. at 550.
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billion dollars and noted that such return was a modest 8.52 percent; 63
however, as noted below, neither this rate nor the fair-value rate base was
used in determining the dollars of revenue requirement. The show-case 8.52
percent was calculated by applying the rate of return of 11.9 percent to the
original-cost rate base to arrive at 647 million dollars as needed NOR; 647
million dollars over a fair-value rate base of 7.7 billion dollars then yielded
8.52 percent as the "showcase" rate of return. 64
The commission did not choose to carry its reported calculations fur-
ther. However, the capital structure requirements in dollars would seem to
emerge as follows:
Pro-Forma Capital Structure: (000 omitted)
Embedded Revenue
Amount % of Total Cost Required
Accounts Payable 90,400 .943 0% 0
Pollution Control Bonds 60,000 .626 11.71 7,026
Long-term Debt 5,035,864 52.551 9.13 459,787
Preferred Stock 1,133,975 11.834 9.42 106,823
Preferred Stock 48,153 .503 4.48 2,150
Common Equity 3,214,360 33.543 17.50 562,450
$9,582,752 11.9% $1,138,235
Original Cost Rate of Return NOR
Rate Base $5,435,100 11.9% $ 647,000
Estimated Capitalized NOR Deferred For Future Recovery $ 491,23565
63. Id.
64. That this was the manner of proceeding is inferred from the conventional manner
of determining an allowable rate of return, id. at 550, and use thereof in supplementary
calculations, id. at 538. The formal findings of the commission mention only the "rea-
sonable" rate of return on "fair value" without indicating the derivation of the "rea-
sonable" rate of return.
65. Id. at 550. Revenue required has been calculated from the tabular presentation of
capital costs. The following year the utility was again at the commission door urging that
it was unable to generate additional external funds needed to carry on another year of
construction and related financial adjustments without an emergency increase in revenues
to remedy a shortfall in actual earnings and rate of return on investment. In re Com-
monwealth Edison Co., 49 P.U.R. (4th) 62, 67 (Ill. 1982). The utility testified that a
permanent increase of $805 million in gross revenue was needed in order to achieve the
17.5% return° for the common equity which the commission had approved the preceding
year. In re Commonwealth Edison Co., 43 P.U.R. (4th)"at 549. Had the capitalized NOR
estimated in the table, and presumed to be deferred for future recovery, been permitted
current recovery in gross revenues before taxes, it would have enabled the utility to achieve
the granted 17.5% return for the common stock as well as to cover the increased cost
of debt with which the utility was faced in 1982. The commission, acting as it is on an
emergency interim basis, granted an increase of $324 million, noting that further relief,
if any, must await a review of the present and forecasted rate base and a redetermination
of the proper rates of return.
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The opinion does not set forth the underlying calculations but an in-
crease in NOR to the amount indicated would indeed improve coverage
for the bonds; significantly, however, the interest coverage of 2.36 times
which was deemed adequate was determined by including AFUDC of the
magnitude estimated in the table above. 66 Inclusion of more CWIP in the
rate base would have commensurately reduced the NOR capitalized and
hence left for future recovery.
Strategic Behavior: Normalization of Tax Benefits versus "Flow
Through"
If only a limited portion of a substantial, probably nuclear, CWIP is
included and if only an inadequate increase in the rate of return is forth-
coming, to what other sources of cash flow may a utility look to help
bridge the gap between the allowed rate base and its capital obligations?
One of the sources of additional revenue is the willingness of some com-
missions to allow normalization of tax benefits arising from investment tax
credits and from liberalization of depreciation deductions for tax purposes.
Congress, in providing such tax benefits through accelerated depreciation
and other changes, had in mind a sharing between rate payers and inves-
tors; conditions imposed may require a state commission to permit the use
of such procedures as "normalization," or accruing or deferring tax ex-
pense, rather than "flowing through" as an immediate benefit solely to
current ratepayers.6 7 Where normalization of taxes is permitted, the usual
utility practice is to determine federal income tax expense as if the utility
has not taken advantage of tax benefits available so as to present com-
mensurately larger income tax expense and commensurately greater reve-
nue requirements. 68
On the other hand, if a commission accepts the reasoning of such
analysts as Davidson, 69 these tax benefits are required to be "flowed
through;" i.e., the tax expense for rate purposes is deemed to be the lower
amounts paid as a result of investment tax credits and larger depreciation
66. Id. at 549. 86076 of common earnings (amount of AFUDC included therein, id.
at 522) if added to allowed NOR would approximate this coverage. Coverage without
AFUDC on the basis of the estimates in the above table would be on the order of 1.4
times rather than 2.36 times. The effect of AFUDC in concealing actual current return
on common equity was informatively revealed in a study by P. R. Chandy and W. N.
Davidson Ill, AFUDC and Its Impact on the Profitability of Electric Utilities, 112 P.
Util. Fortnightly, 34 (Aug. 4, 1983). The study indicated that, for a recent year, elimination
of AFUDC amounting to 82.9% from the NOR of Commonwealth Edison reduced return
on equity from 13.8% to 2.440o.
67. 26 U.S.C. § 167(L) (1984) (accelerated depreciation); id. § 46(f) (investment tax
credit).
68. See, e.g., In re Bangor Hydro-Elec. Co., 46 P.U.R. (4th) at 542.
69. Davidson, Accelerated Depreciation and the Allocation of Income Taxes, 33
Accounting Rev. 173, 179-80 (1958); quoted approvingly by the Louisiana commission in
In re Gulf States Util. Co., 20 P.U.R. (4th) 147, 153 (La. 1977).
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deductions for income tax purposes. This is done on the theory that such
tax savings for a growing utility will continue into the indefinite future and
will not be offset by later tax detriments when the accelerated depreciation
deductions are exhausted and thus give way to smaller depreciation deduc-
tions resulting in larger tax payments later. The Louisiana commission is
one of many state commissions accepting the Davidson recommendations
of "flow through" of tax benefitsT0-it has rejected the normalization pro-
cedure whenever it could and derisively called such taxes "phantom" taxes.7'
Florida leads in thoroughgoing adoption of normalization of tax ben-
efits arising from accelerated depreciation deductions and investment tax
credits, as well as other expenses having accrued or deferred effects due to
a time lag. 7 1 In adopting normalization for telephone ratemaking the Flor-
ida commission said:
The question arises whether our requiring the use of full nor-
malization accounting benefits the ratepayers as well as the utili-
ties. The record clearly reflects this question must be answered in
the affirmative for a number of reasons. First, the ratepayers rec-
ognize the benefits of the cost reduction; that is, the tax reduction
will be passed on to the future ratepayers who will be paying for
the tax deductible charges through increased depreciation expense
during the useful life of the property, rather than to the present
ratepayers during the time the property is being constructed. It
should also be pointed out that while the full normalization con-
cept will require higher rates at first than the partial normalization
concept, future ratepayers will not be required to pay previous
customers' tax expenses in the form of higher rates. Thus, future
rates will be lower than they otherwise would have been ...
We also find that the current ratepayers will benefit by a larger
amount of cost-free capital, which results in a lower cost of capi-
tal. Moreover, the record reflects that the utilities will benefit from
increased cash flow to assist them in financing their construction
programs. These expanded facilities will in turn benefit the future
customer as well because of the availability of service. Finally, it
is clear that revenues will be properly matched with expenses. This
will result in a higher quality of earnings which should produce
lower financing costs due to higher bond ratings which inure to
70. In re Gulf States Util. Co., 20 P.U.R. (4th) at 153-54.
71. Id. at 153. The commission honors the Congressional admonition, denying the
tax benefits of accelerated depreciation if a regulatory commission required the benefits
to be "flowed through" to rate payers. See, e.g., Ex Parte South Central Bell Tel. Co.,
15 P.U.R. (4th) 87, 118 (La. 1976). However, as to state taxes, no normalization has
been permitted. See, e.g., 20 P.U.R. (4th) at 153-54.
72. In re Comprehensive Interperiod Income Tax Allocation, 36 P.U.R. (4th) 518
(Fla. 1980).
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the benefit of the ratepayers. 73
After passage of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, property
placed in service after December 31, 1980 will not be subject to accelerated
depreciation tax benefits, or investment credit benefits unless those tax
benefits are subject to normalization. As to such property, regulatory com-
missions are precluded from requiring flow through of tax benefits without
also risking denial of those tax benefits 7 4 however, regulators do not deem
themselves precluded from regarding the deferred credits or accrued taxes
arising from normalization as cost-free capital and from deducting such
capital from the rate base in setting rates. 75 The "cash-flow" benefit is
thus limited to the additional tax expense normalized in the determination
of net operating revenues. This required equitable split of tax benefits be-
tween ratepayers and investors must be compared with the "at one-time"
statutory requirements of the Investment Tax Credit Act which apparently
required inclusion of savings (deferred taxes) in the rate base and in the
capital structure so as to ensure the benefit inured primarily to the common
stockholder. 76 The section was interpreted, however, to permit the return
on this cost-free portion of the rate base to be measured by the over-all
rate of return rather than the higher common equity rate of return. 77
Cash Flow Role of Normalization
What role does the normalizTtion process play in bridging the gap
between an original-cost rate base and the utility's capital structure when
not all of CWIP is permitted to be added to the rate base? As previously
noted, the procedure involves increasing tax expense for purposes of de-
termining NOR for rate purposes by an amount sufficient to equalize ac-
tual tax expense with pro-forma expense if the tax benefit of depreciation
acceleration were not utilized. As an expense, the taxes are recoverable in
allowed rates, and the enhanced cash flow is assumed to be channeled into
73. Id. at 521-22.
74. 26 U.S.C. § 167(L) as amended by Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 209(d)(3) (1981): see
also Internal Rev. Acts 1980-81, at 1369, 1445-46, 1475-76 (West 1982).
75. See, e.g., In re. Nevada Power Co., 46 P.U.R. (4th) 1, 26-27, 30(Nev. 1982).
An interesting development in this area has occurred as a result of the break-up of the
AT&T system and the transfer of customer-provided equipment from the operating com-
panies to the mother company net of any deferred taxes accumulated as to such property.
The reorganization plan provided for transferring the deferred taxes to the transferor's
common equity, a procedure resisted by some regulatory commissions on the ground the
accumulation represented contributions which should be returned to the ratepayers through
tax reductions and deducted from the rate base as cost-free capital. The development,
including an IRS ruling favoring the reorganization plan, is discussed by Majoras, Tele-
phone Company Deferred Taxes and Investment Tax Credits-A Capital Loss for Ra-
tepayers, 114 Pub. Util. Fort., (21 Sept. 27, 1984).
76. 26 U.S.C. § 46(f)(2)(A)(B) (1983). The Act was so interpreted in Nepco Mun.
Rate Comm. v. FERC, 668 F.2d 1327, 1335-36 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
77. 668 F.2d at 1337.
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construction costs. But, as cost-free capital, it is deemed properly deduct-
ible in the form of deferred taxes from the rate base on which needed NOR
is to be calculated, thus widening the gap between earning rate base and
demanding capital obligations.7 8
The effect is illustrated in a proceeding before the Illinois commission
in 1977.79 CWIP amounted to 279 million dollars; 80 million of CWIP, or
10 percent of the rate base, was allowed in the base on the theory it would
shortly be "on line." ' 80 However, the "gap-closing" benefit was negatived
since deferred taxes resulting from normalization also amounted to some
80 million dollars and were deducted in arriving at the earning rate base.'
Closing the gap rather than widening it was the more appropriate pro-
cedure to the New Jersey commission in a recent case.8 2 The commission
was undeterred by the "used and useful" concept and included in the rate
base not only all CWIP and nuclear fuel in excess of 1.5 billion dollars,
but future plant sites as well, 3 thus closing the gap to within 200 million
dollars of capital obligations; the rate base was fixed at 5.6 billion dollars
with capital obligations equaling 5.8 billion dollars.8 4 Here too, included
in capital obligations were deferred taxes or "cost-free" capital in the
amount of 386 million dollars which in Illinois would have been deducted
from the rate base and would thus have required a commensurately higher
return to assure required cash flow; New Jersey regulators chose not to
make this deduction and applied the determined rate of return to a rate
base of 5.6 billion dollars.85 Because of differences in time periods and
regions it is impossible to compare the effect on the respective common
equity requirements in New Jersey and Illinois, but it seems obvious that
the greater the gap between the rate base and capital obligations, the greater
the reliance must be on "strategic behavior" such as increasing common
equity rate of return or normalization of taxes, where CWIP is of such
magnitude as to make capitalized AFUDC for future earning power not
an adequate solution. 86
78. See, e.g., In re Houston Lighting & Power Co., 50 P.U.R. (4th) 157, 167-68
(Tex. 1982).
79. In re Illinois Power Co., 21 P.U.R. (4th) 416 (I11. 1977).
80. Id. at 428-29.
81. Id.
82. In re Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 46 P.U.R. (4th) 322 (N.J. 1982).
83. Id. at 335.
84. Id. at 336.
85. Id. The argument is made that ratepayers, suppliers of the funds represented by
deferred taxes, are entitled to both a return on and a return of their capital and that
stockholders should not receive that return by allowing deferred taxes in the rate base.
See, e.g. In re Central Me. Power Co., 26 P.U.R. (4th) 388, 411-12 (Me. 1979). Although
plausible, the argument will sometimes, as in New Jersey, be rejected in favor of a pressing
need for revenue.
86. As indicated earlier, a commission will rarely portray in dollars the complete
effects of its strategic moves to assure "ability to attract financing" and hence will leave
somewhat obscure the real return for the common equity. An analysis sometimes concludes
with statements such as one noted from the Illinois commission "a 17.507o return on
equity should result in a 'pre-tax' interest coverage, including AFUDC, of approximately
2.36 times," omitting the more meaningful interest coverage, i.e., excluding AFUDC. In
re Commonwealth Edison Co., 43 P.U.R.(4th) at 549.
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Strategic Behavior; Capitalization of AFUDC at Net of Tax Rather Than
Gross of Tax
The accounting method used to achieve capitalization of AFUDC and
normalization of taxes can play a role in revenue generation strategy to
maintain financial integrity during a large construction program. Thus, if
a so-called "gross of tax" method of normalization is adopted, the AFUDC
is capitalized without reflecting any benefit from the tax deductibility of
interest. Tax expense is then increased by an amount necessary to bring it
to the level it would have been absent accelerated depreciation tax benefits,
and the offset is carried to a deferred tax account. 87 For rate-making pur-
poses the deferred tax account is deemed deductible from the rate base on
the theory that it is cost-free capital on which no return should be paid. If
deducted from the rate base before the related CWIP is put in service, the
effect is to partially offset the benefit to the utility of the cash flow engen-
dered by normalization." If deducted only when CWIP is put in service,
the utility receives the full benefit of normalization currently and the ra-
tepayer enjoys the benefit of lessened depreciation deductions during the
service life. s9 The Maine commission has dealt frequently and at length
with the strategic behavior possible in this area; its normal procedure has
been to insist on flow through of tax benefits on the ground that "match-
ing" principles support it and to require AFUDC capitalization on a "gross
of tax" basis. 90 However, on a showing of a substantial threat to interest
and dividend coverages, the commission has permitted full normalization
of taxes without reduction of the rate base, finding justification in its as-
sumption that such action was superior to "artifically inflating the cost of
equity" and that "additional revenues provided today will at least be re-
flected in a somewhat smaller rate base at the time that the new plant
becomes operational. "91
If a "net of tax" treatment is adopted, AFUDC is capitalized less the
tax benefit factor contained in AFUDC. If normalization is then permitted,
the offset of the normalization increase in taxes may be added to NOR,
thus restoring it to the same level that would obtain if a gross AFUDC
rate and deferred tax accounts were used. 92 Absent normalization, capital-
izing AFUDC "net of tax" would leave the tax element in the current
87. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 73.
88. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 81.
89. See In re Bangor Hydro. Elec. Co., 46 P.U.R.(4th) at 542.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 546.
92. See, e.g., In re Pub. Serv. Co. of Ind. Inc., 17 P.U.R. (4th) 270, 286 n.17 (FPC
1976): "The tax reduction for interest related to CWIP charged to operating expense
accounts is reflected in [lesser] AFUDC capitalized rather than in deferred tax accounts."
With normalization the equivalent amount of tax reductions is charged to current tax
expense and credited to income "below the line" thus restoring "below the line" income
to the same level that would obtain if a gross AFUDC rate and deferred tax accounts
were used.
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interest requirement to be met, along with other return requirements, out
of NOR. 93 "Net of tax" treatment with "flow through" would thus gen-
erate cash flow but only to the extent of this interest element.
94
Strategic Behavior; Computation of the Capitalization Rate for AFUDC
The rate used in capitalizing AFUDC is obviously related to the source
of the funds used in such construction. Thus, if funds used are primarily
short-term debt, their usually higher cost should be reflected in AFUDC.
FERC evolved a procedure for assuring the utility that it would recover its
full cost for such funds in depreciation charges by assuming that the cost
of all short-term debt on the utility books was in AFUDC; the formula
assigned first place to this debt cost in determining the capitalization rate
for AFUDC and any remaining balance was assumed to be carried by long-
term debt, preferred stock, and common equity. 95
A variant of this procedure presents another strategic device for im-
proving cash flow. If permitted to do so, a utility may deliberately compute
AFUDC at a lower rate than the current cost of capital, thus removing a
lesser amount from current revenue requirements. If a commission is sym-
pathetic to a utility's cash needs it may very well permit the practice; in
effect, this is the equivalent of increasing the rate base by an additional
amount of CWIP. If, on the other hand, a commission is unsympathetic,
the practice will be dealt with as it was by a Louisiana commission:
The . . . problem concerning AFUDC relates to the computation
by Gulf States of AFUDC at a rate of 7.5 percent on CWIP. While
this rate may have represented the cost of obtaining capital in the
past, neither Gulf States nor the commission proposes that this is
the cost of capital today. Thus, computing AFUDC at 7.5 percent
defers only a portion of capital costs, to be paid by future rate-
payers, and requires current ratepayers to bear some costs associ-
ated with plant that will be in service in the future. The commission
believes that AFUDC should be computed at a figure more rep-
resentative of the true overall cost of capital and should also take
93. See, e.g., In re Central Me. Power Co., 26 P.U.R. (4th) at 411-12. The utility
argued that it should be permitted to capitalize AFUDC and add to NOR at a rate "net
of taxes," that is, a capitalization rate which was reduced as a result of the tax deduction
for the interest component of the cost of capital devoted to CWIP. Without normalization
as described supra text accompanying note 92, the utility would then have the benefit of
a higher interest element in calculating any deficiency in resulting NOR.
94. In Ex parte Gulf States Utilities, Docket Nos. U.-15640, 15641 (Dec. 12, 1983),
the commission allowed computation of AFUDC on a "net-of-tax" basis without nor-
malization under what appears to be the erroneous impression that this action was
"effectively eliminating current earnings of CWIP."
95. F.P.C. Order 561, Order adopting Amendment to Uniform System of Accounts
for Public Utilities and Licensees and for Natural Gas Companies, 57 F.P.C. 608, 608-
09 (1977).
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into account the rate of return earned by Gulf States. The com-
mission will compute AFUDC at 8.7 percent... -96
An approach more sympathetic to the need for cash flow was adopted
by a Wisconsin Commission:
Applicant presently used a 7 percent, allowance for funds during
construction (AFUDC), rate on amounts in excess of 10 percent
[plus capitalized AFUDC amounts] of net investment rate base. Be-
cause applicant's electric construction work in progress is esti-
mated to be less than 10 percent of rate base, the return allowed
will be the composite cost of capital with no adjustment necessary
for the difference between the 7 percent rate at which AFUDC is
capitalized and the composite cost of capital. 97
Under the Wisconsin dispensation, a utility is permitted to include all CWIP
up to ten percent of investment in the rate base. Where CWIP is less than
ten percent there is little or no difference between the base on which the
dollars of return are calculated and the capital obligations on the basis of
which the over-all rate of return is calculated. However, as to the excess
of CWIP over ten percent, where present, the utility need capitalize only
seven percent on CWIP. The difference between seven percent and the
allowed rate of return may be retained in revenue requirements and will,
of course, be a part of the cash flow available to service capital obliga-
tions. 9s
Strategic Behavior; The Attrition Factor
Even in the absence of a cash flow problem resulting from a rate base
lower than the capital structure of the utility, a utility may legitimately
argue that the allowed rate of return for a test year will prove inadequate
for the immediate future due to attrition. This can result because the re-
lationship between revenues, expenses, and investment reflected in the ad-
justed test year does not remain constant, and the changes therein result
in deterioration in the utility's opportunity to earn its required return. 99
96. In re Gulf States Util. Co., 20 P.U.R. (4th) 147, 156 (La. 1977).
97. In re Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp., 52 P.U.R. (4th) 389, 397 (Wis. 1983).
98. A staff recommendation to the Illinois Commission in In re Commonwealth
Edison, 49 P.U.R. (4th) at 71 (111. 1982), suggested that a permitted equity return of
17.5% be lowered to 1501o for purposes of capitalizing AFUDC or, as an alternative, to
lower it to a point such that a contemplated revenue increase would not increase earnings
for the common stock. It was urged that the lowered amount of capitalized AFUDC thus
resulting would mean future depreciation savings for ratepayers and immediate improvement
in the quality of earnings for the common stock.
99. "[A]ttrition is a wearing away or erosion of the earnings or rate of return due
to increases in investment costs and operating costs which cannot be offset by increased
revenues or through efficiencies or productivity gains." In re Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co., 21 P.U.R. (4th) 451, 463 (Fla. 1977).
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Telephone companies have been in the vanguard in using this phenom-
ena to obtain from the regulators a higher rate of return than would oth-
erwise be warranted by adjusted test year data. The success of their efforts
depends on the plausibility with which the necessarily speculative data is
presented. Thus, a Florida commission was not persuaded that the tele-
phone utility had made a case for adjusting its rate base as an offset to the
attrition factor because the current per-station cost over the embedded per-
station cost, allegedly portraying non-revenue producing plant which the
utility would have to carry, was highly speculative and engendered serious
commission doubts as to whether it portrayed future conditions.' °° None-
theless, conceding the existence of attrition in an inflationary era, the com-
mission allowed the rate base to be adjusted by allowing new plant closings
to plant in service for the ninety day period beyond the test period to be
included in the rate base.' 0 This somewhat subjective allowance was deemed
by the commission to be a "reasonable method . . . consistent with our
desire that the company earn its allowed rate of return but that it not be
overcompensated for this problem." 0
2
On the other hand, a willingness to accept plausible expert projections
was evidenced by the Maine commission; over protests by staff that the
calculations were too speculative to be accepted, that commission approved
an attrition allowance projecting not only increased costs in plant and op-
erating expenses over the test year, but also increased capital costs on which
a higher than test year rate of return was found warranted. 03 Acceptance
was justified on the ground that earnings could not rest on conventional
burden of proof tests but must rest on the persuasiveness of expert testi-
mony expounding the attrition theory.' °4
In a case before the Louisiana commission where rates were being set
some two years later than the test year, the utility argued for the use of a
year-end rate base rather than an average rate base on the ground that
substantial time had passed since the test period (with consequent pre-
sumed attrition having occurred). The commission acquiesed in part, but
noted that it was not making an allowance for attrition which it said must
be "expressly proven."'0 5 In a later case, with the same utility requesting
an attrition allowance,' °6 the requirement of "express proof" was consid-
erably modified, the commission stating that: "If in exceptional circum-
stances attrition causes the rate of return of a utility to decrease beyond
an acceptable level for the utility to continue to build plant [the remedy of
100. Id. at 465-66. The formula proposed to calculate attrition is discussed in Ka-
merschen, Erosion and Attrition: A Public Utility's Dilemna 102 Pub. Util. Fort. 21 (Dec.
21, 1978).
101. In re Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 21 P.U.R. (4th) at 467.
102. Id. at 468.
103. In re Bangor Hydra Elec. Co., 46 P.U.R. (4th) at 565-67.
104. Id.
105. In re Gulf States Util. Co., 20 P.U.R. (4th) at 150.
106. Ex parte Gulf States Util. Co., 40 P.U.R. (4th) 593 (La. 1980).
19851 1055
6LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
interim relief through reduction of the AFUDC required to be capitalized]
... remains available." '10 7 Such an allowance can hardly be said to be for
attrition "expressly proven;"'0 8 all that had been persuasively demon-
strated in the case was that "the inclusion of AFUDC in operating income
at the full rate prevents the utility from meeting coverage requirements and
attracting capital.'" 109
CONCLUSION
Is this welter of "strategic behavior" engendered by the desire of some
regulatory commissions to preserve the "used and useful" rate base as an
operative principle warranted in the era of nuclear plant construction? A
thoughtful New York administrative law judge, after analysis of a record
compiled before the New York utilities commission, concluded that the
policy of capitalizing AFUDC on CWIP, the necessary accompaniment of
the "used and useful" rate base, "has virtually nothing to recommend it.""'°
The commission, although rejecting the judge's recommendation that CWIP
be forthrightly included in earning rate base, summarized the arguments for
inclusion in the following paragraphs:
Increased use of CWIP ... tends to reduce investment risk and
financing cost, according to Judge Harrison. Placing CWIP in rate
base, he observed, increases current cash flows, thereby enhancing
the quality of debt coverage, and reduces future cash flows. Thus,
he said, in contrast to AFUDC policy, where the return is provided
during the principal amortization period - when cash flow is least
important rather than during the capital formation or investment
period - when it is most important - CWIP policy "matches the
timing of cash flows with the financial need for them." This im-
proved timing tends to lessen the financial pressures faced by utili-
ties during construction projects, said Judge Harrison, and the
correspondingly reduced risk is reflected in slightly lower capital
costs...
Arguing in favor of the AFUDC policy is the notion that the fi-
nancial charges applicable to a particular project should be re-
covered solely from customers taking service after the project is
completed and the facilities are in use. Under this reasoning, CWIP
in rate base is undesirable inasmuch as it inequitably forces rate-
payers to pay financial charges on plants still under construction.
But in order to accept this analysis, Judge Harrison said, one must
assume that plant under construction does not serve current cus-
107. Id. at 601.
108. Id. at 600.
109. Id at 597.
110. In re Financing Plans for New York State Gas & Elec. Co., 49 P.U.R. (4th)
329, 347 (N.Y. 1982).
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tomers. In fact, he observed, most ratepayers are not just current
period consumers of electricity, but are placing "economic reliance
on the continuous provision of electricity now and into the future,
without regard to the timing of generation or transmission facility
additions by the utility." Thus, he said, the attempts to "compart-
mentalize" ratepayers in terms of the benefits of service provided by
particular facilities is a "bogus exercise" inasmuch as the benefit
customers actually receive is continuous service over time. More-
over, said the judge, even if customers are analyzed in terms of a
particular facility, the vast majority of customers taking service
during its construction are likely to remain on the system after the
facility goes on line; consequently, "today's ratepayers and tomor-
row's ratepayers, to no small degree, are the same customers."
In addition to discounting the equitable basis advanced on be-
half of AFUDC policy, Judge Harrison discussed the 'unfortunate
economic implication' of the cost recognition procedure under
AFUDC rate making. According to him, the impact of placing a
plant in rate base is sudden and substantial - due in part to the ac-
cumulated financial charges - and rate increases are accordingly
"lumpy." The resulting "lumpy" pattern of demand growth not
only can be "economically disruptive," he said, but it can also make
projections of future load and capacity requirements more diffi-
cult to make. " '
From a rate-making point of view, inclusion of CWIP in rate base
is preferable, observed Judge Harrison, because it results in the de-
velopment of smoother service rates and load growth patterns, and
produces a more efficient allocation of resources ....
Judge Harrison also considered the notion that AFUDC policy
should be retained as a means of providing an incentive for the ef-
ficient operation of the utility. Under this viewpoint, because com-
panies under a CWIP policy would already be earning a return on
uncompleted facilities, they may not have as much incentive as un-
der AFUDC policy to complete a facility as quickly as possible.
Judge Harrison pointed out, however, that construction delays have
been "rampant" in recent years even under AFUDC policy. And
the penalty imposed on consumers for a construction delay, re-
gardless of its cause, is far more severe under AFUDC policy than
under CWIP policy, he observed. When these observations are
added to the previous finding that AFUDC policy imposes signifi-
cantly higher real costs on consumers, said the judge, using AFUDC
111. Another approach to avoiding "lumpy" rate increases by phasing in new plant
after completion is discussed in Merchant, Stockholder Risk and Utility Pricing Strategies,
113 Pub. Util. Fort. 42 (Apr. 26, 1984).
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policy to attempt to force construction efficiency "emerges as the
worst conceivable method of doing so from the ratepayers' stand-
point." The additional cost penalty inherent in AFUDC itself, he
said, "grossly overmatches" the possible benefits of AFUDC pol-
icy as an incentive device ...112
The administrative law judge concluded that there would be slightly lower
capital costs and, hence, somewhat lower consumer rates resulting from in-
clusion of CWIP in the rate base and the accompanying elimination of eco-
nomic disruptions stemming from "lumpy" patterns of demand growth
associated with the "used and useful" rate base and the AFUDC capitali-
zation procedures required in connection therewith.' 3 It remained for the
administrative law judge to demonstrate, if he could, that a cost-benefit
analysis to the ratepayer would result from adopting inclusion of CWIP in
the rate base. Summarily stated, the issue is whether the immediate dollars
of savings in capital costs, and hence consumer rates, would be more valua-
ble to the ratepayer than the use of those dollars to him in the future. Since
the rate of return was assumed to be three or four percentage points in ex-
cess.of the determined inflation rate, a constant dollar analysis indicated the
present savings in the rate of return would be the more valuable to the con-
sumer." 4 In other words, the rate at which consumers could expect money
to compound in the future would generate proceeds which it was suggested
would be less than the savings resulting from a lowered current cost of cap-
ital.
While accepting this analysis as attractive, the New York commission
nonetheless found the argument defective and rejected it because the argu-
ment did not take into account the probability that consumers might have
to borrow to pay higher consumer rates and that the cost of such borrow-
ing could exceed the savings of the utility in lower capital costs." 5 The con-
cluding comments of the New York commission, rejecting CWIP inclusion,
expressed the sentiments of a majority of state commissions, stating:
112. In Re Financing Plans, 49 P.U.R. (4th) at 343-45. A spokesman for Gulf States
Utilities Company, commenting on the possibility of further delays in construction and
approval of its River Bend nuclear plant suggested that: "Estimates of increases that
would result from such a delay are not available, but the increase in the company's
AFUDC (finance charges) alone on its 70% share of the unit at current rates could be
in the range of $250 million-$300 million." Morning Advocate, Sept. 6, 1984, § A, at
1, 6.
113. See In re Financing Plans, 49 P.U.R. (4th) at 344.
114. Id. at 345-346.
115. Id at 346. A FERC staff study, 45 Fed. Reg. 22,053, 22,076 (1980), analogizes
the consequences of normalizing taxes to an involuntary loan advanced by utility customers,
suggesting that the savings in consumer rates could be a worthwhile investment, particularly
to upper income ratepayers. However, the consequences to lower income consumers,
without investment funds and with access to only high interest borrowing, were not
considered as they are here by the New York commissioners.
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We are thus unpersuaded that a case has been made for includ-
ing CWIP in rate base systematically, without regard for the pres-
ence or absence of financial need. Similarly, we are unconvinced
that we should consider the inclusion of CWIP in rate base to be
anything other than an extraordinary remedy, to be employed only
where necessary to improve a utility's financial integrity and inter-
est coverage levels. Accordingly, as in the past, our use of this de-
vice will continue to be selective, and evaluated on a case-by-case
basis, consistent with our findings on bond ratings and interest
coverage above. Our reliance on this and other cash flow enhance-
ments will, of course, be tempered by our concern over the imme-
diate revenue impact of these efforts on current consumers.
We concede that this policy does not alleviate all the shortcom-
ings in the AFUDC method identified by Judge Harrison. But in
our view, the selective inclusion of CWIP in rate base is only one of
the measures that can be taken to preserve a utility's financial in-
tegrity during a construction program.' " 6
The degree of contentment with present practices evidenced by the fore-
going statement is somewhat disturbing.' 7 One might legitimately speculate
as to the thoughts of Justice Brandeis as he perused one of the more prolix
decisions currently being reported. Would he, too, opt for the currently
popular "selective" inclusion of CWIP and retention of the "used and use-
ful" principle (although probably a distortion of his original meaning),
carrying in its wake as it does the kinds of strategic behavior which we have
sought to sample in the foregoing pages? Or would he opt for the greater
simplicity to be achieved by inclusion of CWIP in the rate base and control
of utility financial behavior through oversight of its financial structure and
construction programs and restraint on the common equity return? Would
he say again, as he did some three score years ago:
To give to capital embarked in public utilities the protection guar-
anteed by the constitution, and to secure for the public reasonable
rates, it is essential that the rate base be definite, stable, and read-
ily ascertainable; and that the percentage to be earned on the rate
base be measured by the cost, or charge, of the capital employed in
the enterprise." 8
116. In re Financing Plans, 49 P.U.R. (4th) at 349.
117. The degree of discontent with present procedures may be gleaned from the spate
of adverse comment in the Public Utilities Fortnightly in the late seventies, e.g. Coughlan,
Allowance for Funds in Construction: Accounting Stepchild and Regulatory Football, 98
Pub. Util. Fort. 26 (Nov. 4, 1976); Hyde, A Compromise on Construction Work in
Progress Would Benefit Consumers and Investors, 100 Pub. Util. Fort. 15 (Aug. 18,
1977); Trout, A Rationale for Preferring Construction Work in Progress in the Rate Base,
103 Pub. Util. Fort. 22 (May 10, 1979).
118. Missouri Ex Rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S.
276, 292, 43 S. Ct. 544, 548 (1923) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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The key quantitative measure of financial stability, interest coverage,"19
would not change with the demise of the CWIP dole and with a capitaliza-
tion rate base, as Justice Brandeis envisaged it. The rate of return would be
immediately translatable into dollars of earnings for interest coverage and
return on equity; there would be no AFUDC hiatus to be solved by stra-
tegic behavior to engender cash flow and, perhaps, less need for resort to
"exotic financing."
This is hardly to suggest that regulatory control in the public interest
would diminish; oversight of construction expenditures would assume ma-
jor significance 2 ° and oversight of operating income and expenses and re-
lated problems would continue. The problems of rate design and the search
for equity among users would still present their challenges. Normalization
versus "flow through" would still be a lively topic of regulatory debate but
with primary focus on achieving equity between present and future con-
sumers, and not, as is now often the focus, on improving cash flow. The
reality of nuclear plant abandonments would remain to be dealt with; it is to
be hoped, through reasonable amortization programs and not through the
bankruptcy courts. Interest coverage calculations would return to "pre-tax"
and "after-tax" coverage, without the complication of "with or without
AFUDC earnings." Thus, the move to a capitalization rate base could
hardly be characterized as "shattering" the "sorry scheme of things en-
tire;"'' at best it would qualify as a bit of "re-moulding." And Justice
Brandeis would smile.
119. See, e.g., In re Carolina Power and Light Co., 49 P.U.R. (4th) 188, 254 (N.C.
1982).
120. The Illinois commission has recently listened, seemingly sympathetically, to a staff
witness who pointed out to them that the "traditional model" used for establishing an
appropriate revenue requirement had "lost much of its applicability" because of the
magnitude of the utility construction program and the current state of financial markets.
In re Commonwealth Edison, 49 P.U.R. (4th) at 70. Instead, it was said, emphasis must
be on current higher debt and preferred stock costs, on the effect on market to book
ratios of new equity issuance below book value and on the "painfully expensive" effect
on the utility and ratepayers of abandonment or delay in the completion of plants under
construction. Particularly, the witness noted, emphasis must be on the financial markets'
perception of the utility and market reliance on financial ratios. Specifically, it must take
note of the fact that the AFUDC approach may no longer be feasible and that consequently
the commission must take greater control of construction decisions. Because of the mag-
nitude of these decisions, the commission "has effectively lost any ability to use a
normalized capital structure [capital ratios fitted to a used and useful rate base] and must
consider total interest expenses rather than just interest allocated to plant in service." Id.
at 70 (emphasis added). What-the staff witness is suggesting seems to be that the commission
should move towards a capitalization rate base with control of construction expenditures
as the paramount weapon in maintaining the financial health of the utility.
121. 0. Khayyam, The Rubaiyat, at LXXIII (E. Fitzgerald trans. 1859).
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